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Abstract1
This paper investigates how the control and devolution of productive assets are allo-
cated among husband and wife. Theory predicts that bargaining power within marriage
depends on the division of assets upon divorce (exit option) and on control over assets
during marriage (non-cooperative marriage). In empirical applications, bargaining
power is typically proxied by variables such as dowry payments, assets brought to mar-
riage, and ownership of assets within marriage. Using detailed household data from rural
Ethiopia, we show that assets brought to marriage, ownership of assets, control within
marriage, and disposition upon death or divorce are only partly related. In rural Ethiopia,
control over productive resources is centralized into the hands of the household head, be
it a man or a woman, irrespective of ownership at or after marriage. Disposition upon
death or divorce only loosely depends on individual ownership during marriage but con-
trol over assets is associated with larger claims over these assets upon divorce, a ﬁnding
consistent with the presence of incentive problems. We also ﬁnd that assets brought into
marriage have little impact on disposition upon death, but matter in case of divorce.
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Recent years have witnessed renewed interest in the intrahousehold allocation of
welfare (e.g., Haddad and Kanbur (1990), Chiappori (1988), Chiappori (1992), McElroy
(1990)). Interest has been particularly strong among economists working on poor coun-
tries, where even slight differences in the intrahousehold allocation of scarce resources
can have dramatic consequences on child and female nutrition, morbidity, and ultimately,
mortality (e.g., Haddad and Bouis (1991), Haddad and Hoddinott (1994), Dercon and
Krishnan (2000), Rose (1999)). The empirical evidence collected so far tends to reject
the so-called unitary household hypothesis and to demonstrate that the allocation of con-
sumption and leisure among household members varies systematically with their relative
contributions to household total income (e.g., Thomas (1990), Alderman et al. (1995),
Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995), Chiappori (1993)).2 By themselves, how-
ever, these results provide no guidance as to which policy handles may affect intrahouse-
hold outcomes.
Various theoretical efforts have sought to ﬁll this lacunae by focusing on the deter-
minants of intrahousehold resource allocation. Casting allocation among household
members as a bargaining problem, Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
(1981) have emphasized the inﬂuence that outside options are likely to have on spouses’
bargaining power and hence on intrahousehold welfare. If this approach is correct, one
may hope to affect intrahousehold welfare by improving the exit options of disadvan-
taged groups. To be successful, however, one must ﬁrst identify the relevant exit options.
Two main categories of outside options have been proposed by the literature, namely,
non-cooperation within an existing household -- the so-called ’separate spheres
hypothesis’ of Lundberg and Pollack (1993) -- and separation from the household -- the
exit option that forms the basis of the work of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy
and Horney (1981).3
Support for the exit option hypothesis can be found in empirical work documenting
the role that individual asset ownership and norms regarding the devolution of assets
upon divorce and death plays in intrahousehold allocation (e.g., Hoddinott and Adam
(1997), Dercon and Krishnan (2000), Quisumbing (1994), Agarwal (1997), Thomas,
Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997), Otsuka and Quisumbing (1999), Kevane and Gray
(1998)). Some empirical support for the ’separate sphere’ hypothesis of Lundberg and
Pollak (1993) has also been found. Control over assets during marriage, including the
right to decide how to allocate one’s own labor effort, has been shown to affect the indivi-
dual income of African women (e.g., Jones (1986), Lilja et al. (1996), von Braun and
Webb (1989)). Some success has also been achieved in demonstrating that the attribution
of welfare funds to speciﬁc household members affects consumption patterns (e.g., Lund-
berg, Pollack and Wales (1997)).
Unfortunately, progress has been hampered by the lack of hard evidence on the
non-cooperative options open to women and, a fortiori, other dependents in developing
countries. Contrary to advanced economies where patrimonial laws regarding the control
and ownership of assets within households are relatively uniform and well known, poor
countries are characterized by a mix of state and customary legal systems which
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2 This view is not shared by all, however (e.g., Schultz (2000)). Empirical work is often plagued by
omitted variable bias. There may also be a publication bias in the sense that regressions that show no
effect of bargaining variables on intrahousehold allocation usually do not get reported.
3 Fafchamps (1999) argues that the two should be treated simultaneously. Indeed, the threat of non-
cooperation need not be credible if the spouse can credibly retaliate by leaving the household.2 
singularly complicate analysis. This is particularly true of patrimonial law where legal
principles inherited from colonial times or introduced by enlightened elites often conﬂict
with traditional practices and customs. In the interest of social peace, many Third World
governments tolerate the coexistence of state and customary patrimonial laws, especially
in rural areas. The end result is a complex and opaque system in which the rules deter-
mining the ownership, control, and disposition of productive assets within households
vary with location, ethnicity, and religion within the same country.
In their efforts to study intrahousehold allocation in poor rural areas of the Third
World, economists have had, in the best of cases, to rely on anthropological accounts of
patrimonial customs and, in the worst of cases, on vague generalities about marriage and
divorce practices. In many instances, researchers have even imposed upon intrahouse-
hold allocation legal principles that, even in developed societies, only affect relationships
between households. For instance, assets brought into marriage are often regarded as
individually owned and controled and as inherited or taken back upon divorce. In prac-
tice, however, patrimonial law seldom if ever functions this way: in advanced economies,
assets brought to marriage are often held in common, and the management of productive
assets is dissociated from ownership.4 Rules regarding the disposition of household assets
upon divorce or death often pursue multiple objectives, such as the preservation of viable
economic units (e.g., primogeniture), the protection of underaged children (e.g., attribu-
tion of usufruct of assets to surviving spouse), and the protection of groups who tradition-
ally specialize in home goods (e.g., alimony payment to non-working women). Little is
known, however, of how customary patrimonial law handles these issues in poor rural
areas of the Third World.
This paper seeks to redress this situation by documenting how the control, owner-
ship, and disposition of productive assets within households is de facto organized in rural
Ethiopia. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst effort to document patrimonial customs using
a large household survey and rigorous statistical analysis. It complements previous efforts
by legal experts and anthropologists to describe customary rules regarding marriage and
assets in rural Ethiopia (e.g., Bevan and Pankhurst (1996), Gopal and Salim (1999), The
World Bank (1998)).
While the multiplicity of patrimonial laws and customs may complicate the job of
lawyers and policy makers, it facilitates the study of the determinants of control and
ownership of assets. Ethiopia constitutes the perfect place for our research because of the
wide diversity of cultures and patrimonial traditions that characterize the country.
Different religions, with widely divergent views regarding matrimonial issues in general,
and the status of women in particular, are well represented and, in fact, tend to dominate
different parts of the country -- the Orthodox church of Ethiopia in the north, Sunni
Muslims in the east and west, recently converted Protestants in the south, and animist
beliefs in parts of the south. Anthropological evidence seems to indicate that as one
moves from north to south in Ethiopia, women’s status, and therefore possibly their bar-
gaining power, declines (e.g., Bevan and Pankhurst (1996), Gopal and Salim (1999)).
Such generalizations should be viewed with caution, however, given that the ethnic and
cultural makeup of the country is extremely varied and fragmented. Semitic traditions
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4 In most 19th century Europe, for instance, the law gave husbands the right to manage their wife’s
assets, even when these assets were their spouse’s exclusive property. The same principle continues to
apply today to assets owned by minor children.3 
tend to dominate in the north, Cushitic traditions in the south and east, and Nilotic tradi-
tions in the west, but there is also a lot of ethnic and cultural variation within regions,
especially in the South. Climatic and ecological variation is equally high, given the
mountainous nature of the terrain and the fact that the country stretches from the dry
Sahel to the humid equatorial zone. Finally, local traditions have remained relatively
untouched given the lack of roads and the relative isolation of the countryside.5 The
major exception is the distribution and control of land for which the Ethiopian state has
played a dominant role throughout the centuries.
As we have seen, theory predicts that the bargaining power of household members
depends on two things: expected utility upon divorce, which is determined by the devolu-
tion of assets; and expected utility in a non-cooperative marriage, which presumably
depends on control over assets within marriage (e.g., Lundberg and Pollack (1993)). In
their effort to identify these factors, empirical researchers have typically used a variety of
measures such as dowry and brideprice, ownership of assets at and during marriage, con-
trol during marriage, and legal rules regarding the disposition upon dissolution due to
divorce or death. Due to data limitations, these measures have typically been regarded as
closely related.
Very little empirical evidence, however, is available on the extent to which downry,
brideprice, and assets brought to marriage can be used to predict control during marriage
and division of assets upon divorce or death -- the two processes thought to inﬂuence
bargaining power. The purpose of this paper is to ﬁll this lacuna using data from
Ethiopia. We show that the above mentioned variables are only loosely correlated and
that the intrahousehold allocation of productive assets follow more complex patterns. We
ﬁrst show that ownership and control are two different concepts. Our results suggest that
Ethiopian rural households essentially operate farms as centralized units under the con-
trol of a single individual, irrespective of the intrahousehold division of asset ownership.6
This is consistent with Boserup’s (1965) hypothesis that as households move from hoe to
plow cultivation, farm management becomes centralized because of returns to scale in
management and experience. The person identiﬁed by the surveys as the household head
is the person who manages the farm. The head has exclusive control over most land and
livestock and has a say in nearly all land and livestock decisions, even when control is
not exclusive. If the household is formed around a married couple, the head is typically
the husband, but sometimes it is the wife. Control over expenditures need not be in the
hands of the household head, although it usually is. Control over one category of expen-
ditures is strongly correlated with control over other categories. One possible interpreta-
tion is that centralizing expenditures makes it easier for the household to control its
spending and thus to respect its own budget constraint.
Ownership of productive assets and disposition upon death or divorce are two
different concepts. In many cases, livestock that are regarded as individual property of
the husband or the wife do not go to their ’owner’ upon dissolution. In particular, assets
brought into marriage have little noticeable impact on disposition upon death, but matter
in case of divorce. Rules regarding the devolution of property differ whether dissolution
_ ______________
5 This is not to say that local traditions have not changed at all -- they have, especially in areas
inﬂuenced by urbanization and labor migrations.
6 Important exceptions include enset-growing areas where women seem to play a more central role in
cultivation. It should be noted that, unlike cereal crops, enset cultivation does not rely on animal traction.4 
of the household occurs upon divorce or upon death. For example, livestock that is indi-
vidually owned by one spouse may be shared among them in case of divorce but is typi-
cally inherited by the surviving spouse, irrespective of ownership status. Rules regarding
divorce and inheritance also vary across locations, with more patriarchal rules prevalent
in the Muslim and Protestant south and more egalitarian rules prevailing in the Orthodox
north.
Control over productive resources within the household has a strong effect on dispo-
sition rules in the sense that the spouse with greater control over an asset gets a larger
share of the asset upon divorce or death. This is true even after we control for assets
brought to the marriage. This ﬁnding is important because it brings to light another way
by which the bargaining power of women may be affected. It is also what one would
expect if households wish to provide sufﬁcient incentives for the farm manager to take
good care of land and to invest in productive assets such as oxen and livestock. This issue
deserves more investigation.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 1 with a brief description of
the survey and survey area. We continue in Section 2 with a descriptive analysis of the
relationship between marriage and assets in rural Ethiopia. We focus particularly on the
transfer of assets upon marriage, the control and ownership of assets during marriage,
and the rules regarding asset devolution upon divorce or death. Section 3 examines the
determinants of control and management while section 4 examines the interaction
between assets brought to marriage, control during marriage, and disposition upon disso-
lution of the marriage.
Section 1. The Survey Area
Ethiopia ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world, in part a reﬂection of its
tumultuous recent history. Over the past decade it has seen drought, famine, civil war,
and the demise of a military government leading to a number of policy reversals. As the
third most populous country in Africa, the people of Ethiopia are characterized by sub-
stantial ethnic and religious diversity; there are over 85 ethnic groups and most major
world religions are represented, as well as animist belief systems (Webb and von Braun
1994). This diversity extends beyond the people and culture of Ethiopia to their environ-
ment since the agro-ecological zones, and consequently, farming systems vary dramati-
cally around the country.
The 1997 Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) was undertaken by the
Department of Economics of Addis Ababa University (AAU), in collaboration with the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Center for the Study of
African Economies (CSAE) of Oxford University.7 The 1997 ERHS covered approxi-
mately 1500 households in 15 villages all across Ethiopia, thus capturing much of the
diversity described above. While sample households within villages were randomly
selected, the choice of the villages themselves was purposive to ensure that the major
farming systems were represented.8 Thus, although the 15 villages included in the sample
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7 The 1997 survey built on an earlier IFPRI survey of 1989 and on three rounds of panel survey
conducted by AAU and CSAE in 1994/95. These earlier rounds, however, are not used in the present
analysis.
8 About 400 households in six sites were initially surveyed by IFPRI in 1989; these were selected from
drought-prone areas for a famine study (Webb, von Braun and Yohannes 1992). Three more sites were
added in 1994-1995 to include areas North of Debre Birhan that could not be surveyed in 1989 due to5 
may not be statistically representative of rural Ethiopia as a whole, they are quite
representative of its agro-ecological, ethnic, and religious diversity.
The questionnaires for the ﬁrst four rounds consist of a series of core modules on
various issues such as consumption expenditures, wealth, income, and health, as well as
some 9000 individual anthropometric measurements (Dercon and Krishnan 1996). Com-
plementary to the surveys was a set of 15 village studies covering a broad range of topics
elicited through rapid assessment techniques (Bevan and Pankhurst 1996). Because the
early rounds were not designed to focus explicitly on intrahousehold resource allocation,
detailed information on many individual outcomes is not matched by information on fac-
tors affecting allocation decisions within marriage.
The questionnaire used in the 1997 round includes the original core modules, sup-
plemented with new modules speciﬁcally designed to address intrahousehold allocation
issues. These modules were designed not only to be consistent with information gathered
in the core modules, but also to complement individual-speciﬁc information. For
instance, past survey rounds collected information on plots managed by the household,
but did not include information on the identity of the plot manager. This information and
many other individual-speciﬁc data were covered in the new modules. The modules were
pretested in February/March 1997 in four non-survey sites with a level of ethnic and reli-
gious diversity similar to the sample itself. Data collection took place between May and
December 1997. Questionnaires were administered in several separate visits by enumera-
tors residing in the survey villages for several months. Careful data cleaning and recon-
ciliation across rounds were undertaken in 1998 and 1999 by Bereket Kebede and IFPRI
staff.
The new modules collect information on: the parental background and marriage his-
tories of each spouse; the circumstances surrounding the marriage (e.g., type of marriage
contract, involvement in the choice of a spouse); the pre-marital human and physical
capital of each spouses (e.g., age, education, experience); indicators of predisposition to
domestic violence (e.g., alcohol consumption, exposure to domestic violence among
parents); simple numeracy questions; gender-speciﬁc information on control and owner-
ship of land and livestock; expectations regarding the disposition of assets upon divorce
and death; and individual agricultural labor and time use data. A variety of assets brought
to the marriage were recorded, as well as all transfers made at the time of marriage. The
analysis presented here focuses on the two most important assets in the rural Ethiopian
economy, land and livestock.9
The geographical location of the surveyed villages is depicted in Figure 1. Most sur-
veyed villages are placed along a North-South axis. This ensures a good coverage of the
various agro-climatic zones that characterize the Ethiopian highlands where the bulk of
the population lives. Arid lowlands and other regions that are particularly hard to reach,
such as the western part of the country along the Sudanese border, were excluded from
_ ______________
military conﬂict. Six other sites were also added to represent the main agro-climatic zones and farming
systems of the richer parts of the country. The selection of new sites is described in Bereket Kebede
(1994).
9 This is done to minimize recall error surrounding minor assets, and because productive assets are
likely to be better proxies for bargaining power than, say, food brought by the newlyweds to their new
home. To permit comparison, the value of assets at the time of marriage is converted to current values
using the consumer price index. Given the difﬁculties inherent in a long recall period and in the choice of
an inﬂation correction factor suitable for all 15 villages, these values are likely to be measured with error.6 
the sample for cost reasons. The ethnic and religious composition of the sample is sum-
marized in Table 1. Observations with incomplete or inconsistent data are dropped from
the reported sample. Oxthodox household heads represent 55% of the sample, followed
by Muslims and Protestants. No less than 20 different ethnic groups are represented in the
sample, which we have organized into ﬁve categories. The great majority of couples
share the same ethnicity and religion, but 8.5% of couples are inter-ethnic and in 3% of
them husband and wife have a different religion.
Section 2. Marriage and Assets in Rural Ethiopia
The sample is varied in its household composition (see Table 2). 62% of the sample
is comprised of monogamous couples living together,10 the overwhelming majority of
whom are headed by a man. Single men or women living outside of marriage are the next
most important category -- 22% of the sample. These tend to be older individuals who
have been married before, i.e., widows and divorced women principally. Polygamous
households (or parts thereof) constitute 8% of the sample. Three quarters of the
polygamous households recorded in the survey live together; the rest live in separate
compounds and were regarded as distinct households for the purpose of data collection.
Men or women living separately from their spouse count for another 8% of the sample.
There are sharp differences in household typology across ethnic and religious groupings.
The proportion of single women is highest among the Tigray, a possible reﬂection of the
high male mortality associated with the civil war that raged in and around Tigray from
1977 until 1991. Polygamous households are virtually absent among the Tigray and
Amharas; polygamy is also more frequent among non-Christians.
Most marriages recorded in the sample are celebrated traditionally. Only less than
10% of all rural marriages are celebrated in the church or municipality. Unions are for-
malized using a variety of customary contracts, which can be written or oral in nature
(Table 3). There does not appear to be a strong difference in the type of marriage contract
between male and female headed households. Marriage contracts vary systematically
with ethnicity and religion, with nevertheless a lot of variation around the norm. We
revisit the issue of marriage contracts in greater detail below.
Arranged marriages are the norm in rural Ethiopia. In half of marriages, the choice
of a spouse is left to the head’s or the spouse’s parents. 30% of husbands and 56% of
wives were neither consulted nor directly involved in the choice of a spouse; in 22% of
couples, neither spouse was consulted. Two thirds of respondents had never spoken to
their spouse before marrying them.
We ﬁnd that 10% of marriages are described as ’kidnappings’ by respondents. The
term, however, seems to take different meanings depending on the context. In two thirds
of the reported kidnappings, the bride was not consulted or involved in the choice of
spouse. These cases are likely to be associated with the kind of violent scenario that were
uncovered during pretesting.11 The other cases, in which the bride was consulted or
_ ______________
10 Irrespective of whether they are ’legally’ married or not.
11 One pretest respondent described how the parents of his bride-to-be refused to relinquish the bride
on the marriage day, arguing that some agreed upon gifts had not been made. Out of frustration, the
groom’s relatives took upon themselves to kidnap a teenage girl on their way back from the bride’s village.
Their excuse: they did not want food prepared for the wedding to go to waste. In spite of having broken an
arm ﬁghting her abductors, the girl was married by force to the groom that very same day. Interestingly
enough, in Ethiopia neither rape nor abduction are punishable by law if the victim "freely" contracts a
valid marriage with the abductor (Gopal and Salim 1999, p. 15).7 
involved, are more likely to be a form of ’elopement’ whereby the bride and groom seek
to bypass their families’ disapproval.
A large proportion of respondents were previously married. Of individuals living
together in monogamous marriages, 35% of husbands and 22% of wives were involved in
previous marriages. One third of these previous unions ended due to the spouse’s death;
the rest ended in divorce or separation. Involvement in the choice of a spouse is not
higher among previously married individuals. It therefore does not appear that individu-
als become more involved in the choice of a mate after they have escaped the direct
authority of their parents.
Since marriage typically marks the beginning of a new farm production unit, the
bride and groom bring with them start-up capital in the form of land, oxen, livestock,
household utensils, and grain stocks. The survey recorded all transfers to and from the
bride, the groom, and their respective parents, together with all assets brought to mar-
riage. The available information is summarized in Table 4. By far the most valuable asset
brought to marriage is land, followed by oxen and livestock. Contrary to expectations,
ritual gifts -- e.g., dowry or brideprice -- only account for a small proportion of the
transfers of ownership that take place at the time of marriage. On average, the groom’s
family spends three times as much as the bride’s family in gifts to the bride’s family or
the bride and groom. But the amounts involved are quite small on average and the
median is always zero.
The great majority of the new couple’s assets are brought by the newlyweds them-
selves, with grooms bringing more than 10 times as much start-up capital as brides.
Assets brought to marriage vary dramatically among couples, however, with a median of
zero for most asset categories except livestock and jewelry/clothing/linen. Contrary to
the preconception that marriage is the time at which parents endow their offspring with
farm land, most of the land brought in by grooms was already theirs prior to marriage.
This ﬁnding may be speciﬁc to Ethiopia, given that the state nominally owns all land
(e.g., Gavian and Ehui (1998), Gavian and Teklu (1996)). Use rights over land are sup-
posed to be allocated by Peasant Associations (PA), the local administrative unit in rural
areas, although many regions of the country have not experienced land reallocations in
recent years. Many young men may wait until the PA allocates them land before deciding
to marry.
Inheritance patterns display a similar gap between assets coming from the
husband’s and wife’s lineage. Land and livestock that are inherited after marriage come
primarily from the husband’s family. Daughters hardly ever inherit anything from their
parents. Looking at it from a different angle, we see that, of the land user rights held by
the household, two third actually come directly from the PA (Table 5).12 Family is thus
not the dominant source of land for surveyed households. Of the land that comes from the
family, however, most ultimately comes from the husband’s parents. The same is true for
female headed households, who sometimes gain access to land from their husband or
_ ______________
12 From a strict legal point of view, all land belongs to the state and user rights are ultimately controlled
by the PA. This implies that transfers of land following marriage, divorce, or death must be implicitly or
explicitly supported by the PA. Our data seem to indicate that, in practice, the PA often abstains from
intervening, except when it is directly sollicited by villagers -- e.g., if newlyweds did not receive sufﬁcient
land from their parents. Our analysis should thus be construed as depicting the perceptions or mindset of
rural Ethiopians at a time when PA’s, in some regions at least, appear reluctant to pursue periodic
reallocations of land.8 
husband family, but hardly ever from their own lineage. Women do, however, occasion-
ally receive land from the PA, thereby suggesting a political willingness to depart from
rural norms in the allocation of land to women (Gopal and Salim 1999).13
After marriage, control over ﬁnances and productive assets becomes centralized
while disposition upon divorce or death generally follows equal division, except for land.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize how decisions about crop production and animal husbandry
are made within rural households. Decisions on what to grow are essentially the purview
of the household head, be it a man or a woman. Other household members are associated
with the decision process in only one quarter of the cases. This ﬁnding, however, is partly
an artifact. The land reform instructs the PA to allocate land only to people who farm,
whether male or female. Household members who have been allocated land are regarded
as household head by the PA and, as such, have the right to participate in PA delibera-
tions. Headship thus has a precise administrative deﬁnition that is closely associated with
actual involvement in crop production. By extension, decisions to rent out land or to give
it away, for instance to children, are also predominantly taken by household heads. Some
respondents, however, feel that they do not have the right to alienate land, either because
they only rent it or because land allocation is thought to be the exclusive responsibility of
the PA.
The picture regarding livestock management is more complex, although once again
the role of headship is paramount (Table 6). Most livestock is held by the husband and
wife jointly and individually held livestock nearly always belongs to the head. Even
though animals are owned jointly, the right to sell livestock and to keep the proceed of
the sale predominantly fall in the hands of the household head. This decoupling between
ownership and control is reminiscent of the Napoleon Code of Law which similarly
stipulated that husbands manage all household assets, even those that belong exclusively
to their wife. The main difference is that, in rural Ethiopia today, the household head
sometimes is a woman. Centralized control over land and livestock in the hands of the
head could be interpreted as a desire to manage resources efﬁciently in a farming system
that closely integrates crop and livestock production. The only exception is the right to
keep money generated from the sale of dairy products such as milk, butter, cheese, and
eggs, a right that more often than not goes to women. A likely explanation for this
discrepancy is that most dairy products are sold in processed form and most processing is
performed by women, who need to be given adequate incentives for their work.
Control over expenditures is also centralized in the hands of the household head
(Table 7). Unlike in the coastal areas of West Africa (e.g., Otsuka and Quisumbing
(1999), Goldstein (2000)), only a quarter of all households hold separate ﬁnances. All
aspects of control over expenditures are closely correlated, with little or no specialization
across household members. In more than half of the surveyed households, the head alone
administers all household ﬁnances and incurs all consumption expenditures, including
food, clothes, school fees, and medical expenses. One possible interpretation is that cen-
tralized control over expenditures makes it easier for the household to control its
_ ______________
13 It should be noted, however, that some traditional land tenure systems in Ethiopia did recognize
women a right to inherit from their parents. In the case of the rist land tenure system, which was prevalent
in the Northern part of the country, sons and daughters had an equal right to inherit land. Children of both
sexes were allowed to trace their lineage through their father as well as their mother to claim land
(cognatic descent). In practice, however, women’s right to land were often ignored or implicitly traded in
exchange for family support.9 
spending and thus to respect its own budget constraint. As we show in the next section,
centralized control does not imply that dependents are ignored in the distribution of
assets upon dissolution of the household.
Section 3. The Determinants of Asset Disposition
The literature on women in Africa is replete with tales of widows who face destitu-
tion and of women who lose their home and land upon separation from their husband
(e.g., Adams (1991), Gladwin and McMillan (1989), Jiggins (1989)). The welfare of
widows and divorcees thus appears closely linked to what happens to productive assets
upon divorce or death of the husband. Moreover, it is widely believed (e.g., McElroy and
Horney (1981), Manser and Brown (1980), Lundberg and Pollack (1994)) that legal and
customary dispositions regulating the disposition of assets upon divorce affect the gender
distribution of welfare not only after but also during marriage. The reason is that the bar-
gaining power of married women is thought to depend on their exit option from marriage
because it shapes their threat point within marriage (e.g., Fafchamps (1999)). A proper
analysis of the determinants of asset disposition upon divorce or death of a spouse is thus
essential to our understanding of intrahousehold welfare.
Respondents were asked how they expect various assets to be allocated in case of
divorce.14 Table 8 depicts the distribution of assets and child custody that married house-
holds expect to happen, should a no-fault divorce take place. The table distinguishes
between monogamous and polygamous households. In two third of the cases, respondents
expect the wife to receive custody over young children. Older children, in contrast, are
expected either to follow their father or to choose which spouse they wish to live with.
Half of the surveyed monogamous households expect the land and house to go to the hus-
band upon divorce; another 40% expect them to be divided equally between husband and
wife. Regarding livestock, equal division between husband and wife is the rule, irrespec-
tive of whether the livestock is owned jointly or individually by the husband and the
wife. Individually owned livestock, however, is more likely to be attributed to its owner
upon divorce. Household utensils are principally divided between spouses, although one
third of respondents expect them to go exclusively to the husband. The situation in
polygamous households is more male dominated in the sense that the husband is much
more likely to be given all assets upon divorce. Even there, however, jointly owned lives-
tock is expected to be divided equally in most cases.15
About a quarter of all respondents make a distinction between no-fault and fault-
based divorce. The concept of fault-based divorce is more prevalent in the South-Central
region, especially among Protestants and Catholics. Commonly cited grounds for fault-
based divorce are listed in Table 9. Drunkenness, wife-beating, adultery, and failure to
support one’s wife are most cited as husband faults that justify divorce, while adultery,
involvement in crime, disrespect, and disposition of assets without consultation are the
_ ______________
14 Divorced respondents were asked instead how assets were actually divided when they divorced their
previous spouse. No statistical difference was found between the realized asset division of divorcees and
the anticipated asset division of married people. All answers are combined here.
15 Based upon interviews conducted during the pretest, it appears that polygamous households in rural
Ethiopia keep separate ﬁnances for each union. For example, a polygamous husband typically owns some
livestock jointly with his ﬁrst wife, some other livestock jointly with his second wife, etc. Equal
distribution thus refers to the portion of the polygamous household’s assets that belong to the union being
dissolved.10 
most commonly cited faults for wives. The allocation of assets upon fault-based divorce
varies considerably depending on who is at fault. If it is the husband, the wife is slightly
more likely to be granted land and livestock (Table 10). If it is the wife who is at fault,
asset distribution is dramatically changed in favor of the husband. Even her own lives-
tock is likely to go to her husband. Fault-based divorce thus encompasses an element of
punishment, which is particularly harsh for wives. It is somewhat ironic that customs
penalizing adulterous and disrespectful wives are found primarily among rural popula-
tions recently converted to western-style religions. So much for social progress and
western ideals.
Disposition of assets upon death is summarized in Tables 11 and 12. Upon the death
of the household head, assets are most likely to go to the surviving spouse, together with
child custody. This is even more true in case of the spouse’s death. It is interesting to note
that the devolution of livestock to the surviving spouse is essentially unaffected by who
owns it. Children inherit in less than half the cases, and when they do, it is usually
together with their mother. A similar pattern is observed among polygamous households.
The inheritance system is thus primarily designed to enable the surviving spouse to con-
tinue operating the farm and taking care of the children.
There are, however, sharp differences in customs across locations, ethnic groups,
and religions. These differences are illustrated in Table 13 with the help of regression
analysis. The Table focuses on the disposition of the two main productive assets, land and
jointly owned livestock, upon no-fault divorce. Results show that much of the variation
in rules of disposition is due to location, with northern locations in general more gen-
erous towards women. There is also systematic variation across ethnic or religious
groups, as the Amhara are better disposed toward women than other groups while
Muslim households are less willing to grant productive assets to women, even after con-
troling for location and ethnicity. The single best predictor of expected disposition of
assets is the average disposition rule for household of the same religious group residing
in the same location. This is consistent with the idea that the disposition of assets is pri-
marily governed by location and religious speciﬁc norms.
Norms are not everything, however. Part of the variation in rules of disposition can
also be attributed to differences in marriage contracts. Results suggest that the presence
of a marriage contract in general protects women, although the effect is not strong once
we control for location, ethnicity, and religion. We also investigate whether expected
rules of disposition upon divorce vary systematically with assets brought into marriage,
inherited assets, and individual ownership of assets at the time of the survey. To the
extent that pre-marital assets and individually owned assets are earmarked to a particular
spouse, we would expect this to be reﬂected in the disposition of assets upon divorce.
This is important because, if spouses recover their pre-marital and inherited assets when
they leave each other, exit options and thus threat points are largely determined in the
marriage market. In this case, the position of women during marriage is likely to be
weakened by the fact that, as we have seen, they are disadvantaged in the attribution of
pre-marital assets. In contrast, if pre-marital assets are merged into the community,
women should fare better on average.
To test this hypothesis, we regress disposition of land and livestock on various
categories of assets brought into marriage, land inherited after marriage, and land user
rights and livestock ownership at the time of the survey.16 Results show that land
_ ______________
16 Strictly speaking, surveyed households do not ’own’ land since all agricultural land is legally owned11 
inherited or brought into marriage by one of the spouses affects the disposition of land
and livestock upon divorce. Women expect to receive more land and commonly held
livestock upon divorce if they brought in some land. Conversely, they expect to get less if
their husband brought a lot of land into the marriage. Ownership of productive assets at
the time of the survey also affects rules of disposition. Women who individually own
more livestock and hold user rights on a larger share of the household’s land expect to
receive more upon divorce. Since individual ownership of productive assets during mar-
riage is closely related to control and management of these assets, and thus to female
headship of married couples, we ﬁnd that female heads of household expect to receive
signiﬁcantly more productive assets upon divorce than women in male headed house-
holds.
We also examine the determinants of inheritance. Since the surviving spouse nearly
always inherits part or all of the land and livestock acquired during marriage, we focus
on whether wives inherit all land and livestock or have to share with other heirs, princi-
pally children. Results are less conclusive than for divorce but they nevertheless show
large differences across locations and between various ethnic and religious groups,
although these differences are not always signiﬁcant (Table 14). Women in the south,
principally among the various south-central ethnic groups, are less likely to inherit all
land and livestock. This is partly compensated by the fact that non-Orthodox women are
more likely to have exclusive inheritance rights to land and livestock.
The presence of children from previous marriages has a strong effect on inheritance
expectations: women with children of their own are more likely to inherit all land and
livestock while those whose husband has children of his own are less likely to inherit.
Ownership of assets at the time of interview seems to have little effect on inheritance
expectations, except that women are less likely to inherit all household land if their hus-
band owns more of the household livestock. Surprisingly, the presence of a marriage
contract is correlated with weaker inheritance rights for women. One possible interpreta-
tion is that the presence of a marriage contract signals an intention to create a stable mar-
riage and to have children, and is thus related with the expectation that a surviving wife
will share household assets with children upon the death of her husband. This is con-
sistent with the tendency for wives to outlive their husbands due to younger age at mar-
riage and to the longer life expectancy of women relative to men.
Section 4. The Determinants of Control and Management
We have seen that the control and management of assets and ﬁnances is typically
centralized into the hands of the household head. We also found that control over assets
has an effect on asset disposition upon divorce that is distinct from asset ownership per
se. In particular, we found that female heads of household expect to get more of the
household land and livestock upon divorce. The fate of women after marriage therefore
depends on the control they have over assets during marriage. For this reason, it is impor-
tant to examine the determinants of control and management over productive assets.
We investigate two important dimensions of control and management: individual
ownership of livestock or user rights over land; and female headship in married couples.
User rights to land are given by the PA to a particular individual who is typically the
head of household. There nevertheless exist more complicated cases in which a woman
_ ______________
by the state. We sometimes disregard this distinction in the text to ease the ﬂow of the presentation.12 
either retains land from a previous marriage, or receives land separately from her hus-
band after marriage. We construct a variable that represents the share of household land
that was ’brought in’ by the wife, either from the PA or through inheritance. Around 12%
of married women hold user rights on some or all of the household land. We construct
similar variables for individually owned livestock of the husband and the wife. 25% and
6% of livestock are owned by the husband and the wife, respectively. The rest is owned
jointly. Given that all land is ultimately obtained from the PA, there is no concept of
jointly held land, so that user rights not held by the wife are by deﬁnition held by the hus-
band.
Regression analysis indicates that individual ownership of livestock and land
depend critically on assets brought into marriage either at the time of marriage, or later
through inheritance (Table 15). The effect is strong and signiﬁcant. Gifts made by the
groom’s family to the bride or the bride family also decrease assets individually held by
the wife during marriage, casting doubt on conventional interpretations that brides with
larger dowries have greater bargaining power within their households. The reverse is not
true for livestock individually owned by husbands.
We also examine female headship in married couples (Table 16). There are some
9% of female heads among all married households. In 70% of those, the husband is
absent. Absentee headship is not observed in the sample: all married households from
which the husband is absent have a female head. This suggests that the ’land to the tiller’
philosophy embedded in the Ethiopian land reform is understood to sanction absentee
husbands as much as absentee landlords. Regression analysis shows that, conditional
upon marriage, a married couple is more likely to be headed by a woman if the wife
brought more assets into the household, was married before, and already had children
from a previous marriage. The opposite is true when it is the husband who brought in
more assets or had children from a former union. The picture that emerges from these
results is one by which married women are more likely to be recognized as head of
household if they bring more assets to the household, assets that they possibly obtained
through previous unions. The form in which assets are brought into marriage does not
seem to matter.
Conclusion
Using household level data, we have examined the distribution of control and own-
ership of productive assets among husband and wife in rural Ethiopia. Contrary to what is
often assumed in empirical work on intrahousehold issues, we have shown that owner-
ship of assets, control within marriage, and disposition upon death or divorce only par-
tially overlap. Rules regarding divorce and inheritance vary dramatically between
different locations in the same country. Disposition upon death or divorce only loosely
depends on individual ownership during marriage while assets brought into marriage
have little impact on disposition upon death, but matter in case of divorce. Control over
productive resources tends to be centralized into the hands of the household head, be it a
man or a woman, irrespective of ownership at or after marriage. Control over assets is
associated with larger claims over these assets upon divorce, a ﬁnding consistent with the
presence of incentive problems.
Although it would be dangerous to infer policy recommendations from the work
reported here, our analysis indicate that policy can matter. Findings suggests that, in their
land allocation function, local administrations have been willing to grant user rights to
women, albeit reluctantly perhaps (e.g., Gopal and Salim (1999), The World Bank13 
(1998)). This is so even though in local customs women hardly ever inherit land from
their lineage.17 The government’s ’land to the tiller’ policy thus allowed -- or may even
have facilitated -- the attribution of user rights over land to women. This attribution,
however, nearly always results from conditions internal to the household, such as separa-
tion or death of the husband; in most cases, women’s access to land remains conditional
upon the absence of a suitable male head of household.18
Another indication that external intervention may have an impact on local customs
is the observed link between the concept of fault-based divorce and conversion to non-
orthodox christian faith. The spread of Catholicism and Protestantism to rural Ethiopia is
indeed fairly recent, particularly in the South. Yet it seems to be correlated with a fault-
based concept of divorce -- or more precisely with the perception that fault plays an
important role in ﬁnancial settlement upon divorce.19 Since the patrimonial penalties
associated with fault-based divorce are the most stringent for women, they are the main
victims of the concept. Besides, even on an ethical point of view, the development of
fault-based divorce hardly appears appropriate in a setup in which most marriages are
arranged by parents, women have little or no say in the choice of a spouse, and wife kid-
napping remains practiced in parts of the country. These issues deserve more investiga-
tion.
What we have not done in this paper is ascertain whether control over assets and
expectations regarding devolution of assets upon divorce have an effect on the intra-
household distribution of welfare. The analysis presented here also takes couples as
given, without raising the question of how they came to get married to each other. Both
these issues are the object of future research.
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534, Apr. 1989.Table 1. Ethnic and Religious Composition of the Sample
South-
Total Other Central (3) Oromo Amhara Tigray
768  29 115 75 403 146 Ethiopian orthodox
313  56 16 232 3 6 Muslim
285  4 255 13 6 7 Other christian (1)
40  0 40 0 0 0 Other religion (2)
1406  89 426 320 412 159 Total
Note: based on the ethnicity and religion of the household head. (1) primarily protestants. 
(2) primarily animists. (3) a variety of ethnic groups residing in the South-Central highlands.Table 2. Typology of Households in the Sample
% of sample Number
Monogamous households living together
60.1% 853 Husband and wife living together; male head
1.7% 24 Husband and wife living together, female head




6.0% 85 Husband and wife living together
1.5% 21 Husband living separately




1420 Number of observationsTable 3. Marriage Contracts
(currently married couples only).
All Female Male
households head head
11.7% 8.8% 11.9% No contract
38.9% 38.5% 38.9% Samanya (always written)
21.7% 30.8% 20.9% Nika (written or verbal)
5.9% 6.6% 5.8% Cheb (written or verbal)
13.0% 5.5% 13.6% Kalkidan (verbal)
8.9% 9.9% 8.8% Other contract (written or verbal)
1088 91 997 TotalTable 4. Asset Brought to Marriage
(measured in Ethiopian Birr, actualized to the time of the survey; currently married couples only).
of the bride of the groom 1. Pre-Marriage Assets
Median Mean Median Mean
0 29 0 500 Value of land received at marriage
0 66 0 1983 Value of land already owned
0 281 215 1140 Value of oxen and livestock already owned
0 14 124 268 Value of jewelry/cloth
0 14 0 140 Value of household utensils
0 3 0 401 Value of grain stocks
0 407 1779 4433 Total
Median Mean 2. Gifts at the time of marriage
0 33 From groom family to groom
0 27 From bride family to bride
0 18 From bride/bride family to groom
0 96 From groom/groom family to bride
0 1 From bride/bride family to groom family
0 92 From groom/groom family to bride family
0 13 From groom/groom family to bride and groom
0 32 From bride/bride family to bride and groom
to the wife to the husband
Median Mean Median Mean 3. Inheritance after the marriage
0 96 0 967 Value of inherited landTable 5. Land ownership and management
(currently married households only)
Female Male All
p-value t-test head head households 1. Access to land:
0.4650 0.7309 1.82 3.54 3.39 Land with full user rights
Source of land:
65.2% 60.5% 60.7% Peasant Association
13.5% 26.9% 26.3% Husband's parents
3.8% 1.3% 1.4% Wife's parents
12.3% 0.4% 1.0% Husband or wife
2.4% 3.7% 3.6% Relative
2.8% 7.2% 7.0% Non-relative
0.4669 0.7279 0.03 0.42 0.39 Rented in
0.8282 0.2170 0.18 0.37 0.35 Rented out
92 935 1027 Number of observations:
2. Management:
Female Male All In share of land for which:
p-value t-test head head households a. choose what to grow:
0.0000 17.2331 1.3% 76.4% 70.4% Husband alone
0.0000 29.3352 20.1% 94.3% 88.4% Husband alone or with other hhold members
0.0000 -41.4053 62.5% 0.1% 5.0% Wife alone
0.0000 -17.0607 83.2% 15.0% 20.4% Wife alone or with other hhold members
b. give away land:
0.0000 9.3660 2.1% 52.3% 48.3% Husband alone
0.0000 8.3044 23.8% 66.7% 63.3% Husband alone or with other hhold members
0.0000 -28.4655 45.2% 0.0% 3.6% Wife alone
0.0000 -14.7511 71.0% 12.9% 17.5% Wife alone or with other hhold members
c. rent out land:
0.0000 13.2818 0.0% 65.4% 60.2% Husband alone
0.0000 15.8542 25.3% 84.4% 79.7% Husband alone or with other hhold members
0.0000 -37.9901 58.7% 0.0% 4.7% Wife alone
0.0000 -16.6350 88.8% 17.9% 23.5% Wife alone or with other hhold members
79 915 994 Number of observations:Table 6. Livestock ownership and management
(Livestock aggregated by value)
Female Male All
p-value t-test head head 1. Ownership of livestock:
0.1470 1.4511 1914 2324 2287 Total livestock
of which:
646 1727 1631 Onwed jointly by husband and wife
793 402 436 Owned by head alone
188 54 66 Owned by spouse alone
144 65 72 Owned by head jointly with others
143 76 82 Owned by others
98 1007 1105 Number of observations:
2. Management:
Female Male All In shares of animals for which:
p-value t-test head head households a. Sell animals
0.0000 7.3389 2.2% 41.0% 37.7% Husband alone
0.0000 23.4313 23.9% 92.2% 86.4% Husband alone or with other hhold members
0.0000 -30.2222 58.9% 1.5% 6.3% Wife alone
0.0000 -6.0913 85.4% 52.2% 54.9% Wife alone or with other hhold members
79 862 941 Nber. obs.
b. Own offspring
0.0000 6.4685 1.4% 34.9% 32.0% Husband alone
0.0000 18.9295 24.4% 88.8% 83.3% Husband alone or with other hhold members
0.0000 -25.0546 55.8% 2.3% 6.9% Wife alone
0.0000 -5.1484 83.6% 55.7% 58.1% Wife alone or with other hhold members
78 830 908 Nber. obs.
c. Keep sales proceeds
0.0000 8.3471 2.2% 47.7% 44.0% Husband alone
0.0000 20.8272 22.9% 90.3% 84.8% Husband alone or with other hhold members
0.0000 -22.9420 57.0% 3.1% 7.5% Wife alone
0.0000 -6.7308 82.6% 45.2% 48.3% Wife alone or with other hhold members
77 858 935 Nber. obs.
d. Keep dairy money
0.0101 2.5799 0.5% 11.2% 10.4% Husband alone
0.0000 4.1705 23.9% 52.2% 50.0% Husband alone or with other hhold members
0.0064 -2.7362 52.5% 34.9% 36.2% Wife alone
0.5095 -0.6600 79.2% 75.5% 75.8% Wife alone or with other hhold members
54 650 704 Nber. obs.Table 7. Control Over Household Finances
Female Male All (currently married households only)
head head households A. Joint or separate finances:
71.1% 69.7% 69.8% Joint finances
28.9% 30.3% 30.2% Separate finances
97 1009 1106 Number of observations
B. Control Over Finances
55.9% 50.7% 51.1% Head alone
11.8% 15.9% 15.5% Head and spouse separately
11.8% 29.8% 28.2% Head and spouse jointly
3.2% 0.6% 0.8% Spouse(s) alone
14.0% 3.0% 3.9% Head with children
3.2% 0.1% 0.4% Children alone
93 1008 1101 Number of observationsTable 8. Disposition upon No-Fault Divorce
(based on currently married households only)
Household Livestock of: House Land Old Young
Utensils both wife husband children children
1. Monogamous couples
33.3% 23.7% 11.1% 44.3% 57.3% 52.6% 49.4% 21.8% Husband
6.3% 2.4% 32.8% 1.7% 2.7% 2.2% 6.9% 64.0% Wife
57.7% 68.0% 50.0% 45.1% 38.2% 41.9% 7.4% 6.5% Divided half/half
0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 3.4% 0.1% 0.2% 32.4% 6.3% Children choose
2.4% 5.7% 6.1% 5.5% 1.8% 3.1% 3.9% 1.5% Other
965 877 594 759 967 959 815 878 Number of valid observ.
2. Polygamous couples
46.5% 36.3% 19.7% 58.5% 69.6% 68.4% 67.3% 24.3% Husband
8.8% 3.5% 34.2% 0.0% 3.5% 0.0% 3.7% 68.2% Wife
40.4% 54.9% 35.5% 31.9% 24.3% 28.1% 2.8% 3.7% Divided half/half
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.5% 1.9% Children choose
4.4% 5.3% 10.5% 9.6% 2.6% 3.5% 4.7% 1.9% Other
114 113 76 94 115 114 107 107 Number of valid observ.Table 9. Grounds for Fault-Based Divorce
(Percent of respondents citing following reasons)




15.3% 35.1% Failure to support spouse
37.1% 6.9% Disposition of assets without consultation
6.9% 16.3% Profligacy/spends too much
C. Work
21.2% 15.7% Laziness





56.4% 24.5% Involvement in crime
30.5% 39.2% E. Other reason
321 319 Number of valid answers
Note: Other respondents do not consider that divorce settlement depends on fault.Table 10. Disposition Upon Fault-Based Divorce
Household Livestock of House Land Old Young
Utensils both wife husband children children 1. Husband at fault
14.5% 9.3% 0.8% 34.1% 45.2% 41.2% 43.0% 18.8% Husband
31.3% 16.9% 57.6% 16.2% 29.3% 16.5% 19.6% 65.8% Wife
44.5% 62.9% 25.0% 36.8% 17.8% 31.9% 3.8% 5.0% Divided half/half
0.8% 0.4% 0.8% 0.5% 0.4% 1.5% 27.2% 8.3% Children choose
9.0% 10.5% 15.9% 12.4% 7.3% 8.8% 6.4% 2.1% Other
256 248 132 185 259 260 235 240 Number of valid observ.
2. Wife at fault
66.0% 59.4% 34.8% 71.9% 84.8% 78.6% 61.9% 33.8% Husband
4.7% 0.0% 34.8% 2.7% 0.8% 0.0% 4.8% 52.1% Wife
20.3% 30.5% 13.0% 14.1% 6.3% 11.7% 2.6% 3.8% Divided half/half
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.1% 7.5% Children choose
9.0% 10.0% 17.4% 11.4% 8.2% 9.7% 5.6% 2.9% Other
256 249 138 185 256 257 231 240 Number of valid observ.
Note: Results based upon monogamous couples only.Table 11. Disposition upon Death of Head of Household
Household Livestock of House Land Old Young
Utensils both wife husband children children
1. Monogamous couples
63.4% 59.5% 66.6% 57.9% 58.5% 53.3% 80.3% 86.0% Surviving spouse(s)
3.3% 2.2% 2.7% 2.6% 3.2% 3.2% 6.8% 5.6% Head's relatives
4.9% 5.3% 4.0% 8.5% 6.3% 10.3% 2.5% 1.4% Children
28.0% 32.4% 24.9% 28.9% 31.4% 32.3% 7.8% 6.7% Spouse and children
0.3% 0.6% 1.8% 2.1% 0.5% 0.8% 2.8% 0.3% Other
970 861 595 729 965 959 800 871 Number of valid observ.
2. Polygamous couples
56.6% 48.6% 63.8% 47.8% 48.2% 40.7% 83.5% 86.8% Surviving spouse(s)
3.5% 2.8% 2.9% 3.3% 2.6% 4.4% 6.8% 7.5% Head's relatives
3.5% 3.7% 4.3% 8.7% 5.3% 15.0% 3.9% 0.9% Children
31.0% 39.3% 29.0% 34.8% 40.4% 36.3% 3.9% 3.8% Spouse and children
5.3% 5.6% 0.0% 5.4% 3.5% 3.5% 1.9% 0.9% Other
113 107 69 92 114 113 103 106 Number of valid observ.Table 12. Disposition upon Death of Spouse
Household Livestock of House Land Old Young
Utensils both wife husband children children
1. Monogamous couples
76.8% 72.9% 69.4% 74.7% 78.4% 76.1% 88.3% 89.0% Surviving spouse(s)
1.4% 1.5% 2.3% 1.9% 1.3% 1.8% 3.2% 6.0% Head's relatives
3.0% 3.0% 6.3% 2.8% 1.7% 2.0% 1.7% 0.2% Children
18.6% 22.1% 19.8% 19.1% 18.5% 20.0% 5.7% 4.6% Spouse and children
0.2% 0.5% 2.1% 1.5% 0.1% 0.2% 1.1% 0.2% Other
968 864 605 723 969 961 811 872 Number of valid observ.
2. Polygamous couples
69.4% 65.7% 67.6% 78.4% 75.7% 76.6% 92.3% 87.5% Surviving spouse(s)
1.8% 1.9% 1.4% 1.1% 0.9% 1.8% 1.0% 5.8% Head's relatives
7.2% 5.7% 7.0% 2.3% 3.6% 1.8% 1.0% 1.0% Children
19.8% 25.7% 22.5% 18.2% 18.9% 18.9% 2.9% 1.9% Spouse and children
1.8% 1.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.9% 0.9% 2.9% 3.8% Other
111 105 71 88 111 111 104 104 Number of valid observ.Table 13. Regression Analysis of Disposition of Assets Upon Divorce
(currently married households only; estimator is two-limit tobit)
Share of land Share of jointly owned livestock
 going to wife  going to wife
t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. 1. Assets brought to the marriage
-3.966 -0.018 -2.343 -0.007 log(value+1) Pre-marriage land of husband
1.095 0.006 0.241 0.001 log(value+1) Pre-marriage livestock of husband
-0.852 -0.005 -1.317 -0.005 log(value+1) Other assets brought to marriage by husband
0.256 0.001 0.133 0.000 log(value+1) Inherited land of husband
5.235 0.050 3.745 0.025 log(value+1) Pre-marriage land of wife
0.287 0.002 0.286 0.001 log(value+1) Pre-marriage livestock of wife
-1.613 -0.019 0.040 0.000 log(value+1) Other assets brought to marriage by wife
0.308 0.002 2.520 0.013 log(value+1) Inherited land of wife
2. Asset ownership during marriage
2.839 0.187 0.250 0.012 share Share of land user rights of wife
-3.391 -0.173 -2.307 -0.069 share Share of livestock owned by husband alone
2.065 0.159 2.469 0.128 share Share of livestock owned by wife alone
3. Marriage contract
0.914 0.074 3.476 0.225 2.124 0.104 2.272 0.086 dummy Samanya (always written)
-0.634 -0.082 3.434 0.227 0.547 0.042 2.672 0.098 dummy Nika (written or verbal)
0.817 0.122 0.509 0.054 0.194 0.014 1.950 0.099 dummy Cheb (written or verbal)
2.369 0.209 2.428 0.177 2.001 0.098 1.704 0.072 dummy Kalkida (verbal)
1.231 0.114 1.993 0.150 1.663 0.086 1.341 0.058 dummy Other contract (written or verbal)
4. Social norm
16.224 1.828 16.673 1.374 share Location and religion specific average
5. Location
1.752 0.147 1.963 0.125 dummy Geblen village dummy
-0.380 -0.045 -1.062 -0.091 dummy Dinki village dummy
1.788 0.219 -0.462 -0.041 dummy Yetmen village dummy
0.884 0.103 -0.962 -0.081 dummy Shumshaha village dummy
0.099 0.011 0.068 0.005 dummy Sirbana Godeti village dummy
-2.887 -0.395 -2.931 -0.248 dummy Adele Keke village dummy
0.481 0.055 0.513 0.041 dummy Korodega village dummy
1.168 0.110 0.427 0.029 dummy Trirufe Kechema village dummy
-2.715 -0.616 1.693 0.188 dummy Imdibir village dummy
-3.553 -0.596 0.845 0.082 dummy Aze Deboa village dummy
-2.688 -0.426 -4.102 -0.426 dummy Adado village dummy
-4.130 -0.714 -4.281 -0.415 dummy Gara Godo village dummy
. -2.321 0.508 0.048 dummy Doma village dummy
0.895 0.112 -0.320 -0.029 dummy Debre Birhan village dummy
6. Ethnicity
-0.268 -0.024 1.677 0.110 dummy Amhara
-0.290 -0.024 1.552 0.094 dummy Oromo
-0.432 -0.053 -0.298 -0.023 dummy South-Central ethnic groups
0.181 0.020 -0.804 -0.061 dummy Other ethnicity
7. Religion
-1.659 -0.180 -2.277 -0.158 dummy Muslim
-1.272 -0.099 -0.638 -0.026 dummy Catholic and protestants
-0.587 -0.099 0.393 0.033 dummy Other religion
2.897 0.279 -9.373 -0.618 5.926 0.362 -6.849 -0.269 Intercept
0.318 0.360 0.245 0.257 Selection-term
798 1020 769 919 Number of observations
450 574 210 246 of which are 0
333 426 540 648 of which are between 0 and 1
15 20 19 25 of which are 1
0.559 0.450 0.547 0.468 Pseudo-R square
Note: Harresaw is omitted village; Tigray is omitted ethnicity; Orthodox is omitted religion; no marriage contract is omitted contract category.Table 14. Regression Analysis of Disposition of Assets Upon Death of Husband
(currently married households only; estimator is logit; coefficients are reported as odds ratios.)
Wife inherits Wife inherits
all land all jointly owned
   livestock
t stat. Odds t stat. Odds 1. Children
-0.518 0.983 0.759 1.024 Number Children from current marriage
-2.952 0.901 -3.051 0.904 Number Husband's children from previous union
3.192 1.307 3.532 1.344 Number Wife's chidren from previous union
2. Asset ownership during marriage
-0.545 0.778 0.072 1.033 share Share of land user rights of wife
-2.179 0.572 -1.435 0.697 share Share of livestock owned by husband alone
-0.339 0.824 -0.825 0.634 share Share of livestock owned by wife alone
3. Marriage contract
-0.536 0.781 -0.052 0.977 dummy Samanya (always written)
-0.418 0.751 -0.896 0.550 dummy Nika (written or verbal)
-1.150 0.517 -3.097 0.170 dummy Cheb (written or verbal)
-1.790 0.486 -0.794 0.737 dummy Kalkida (verbal)
-0.526 0.791 -0.746 0.719 dummy Other contract (written or verbal)
4. Location
-0.489 0.746 -0.101 0.943 dummy Geblen village dummy
-1.280 0.340 -0.951 0.447 dummy Dinki village dummy
-2.307 0.125 -2.564 0.095 dummy Yetmen village dummy
0.318 1.319 0.179 1.170 dummy Shumshaha village dummy
1.437 3.222 1.235 2.698 dummy Sirbana Godeti village dummy
-1.925 0.200 0.147 1.126 dummy Adele Keke village dummy
-0.410 0.727 0.119 1.098 dummy Korodega village dummy
0.352 1.272 0.775 1.720 dummy Trirufe Kechema village dummy
-0.124 0.880 1.380 4.123 dummy Imdibir village dummy
1.322 3.522 1.356 3.561 dummy Aze Deboa village dummy
-0.572 0.580 0.720 1.958 dummy Adado village dummy
1.491 3.921 2.341 8.722 dummy Gara Godo village dummy
-2.272 0.095 -0.424 0.679 dummy Doma village dummy
-0.020 0.983 -0.171 0.859 dummy Debre Birhan village dummy
6. Ethnicity
-0.004 0.997 0.264 1.208 dummy Amhara
-1.571 0.371 -1.297 0.440 dummy Oromo
-2.481 0.149 -2.357 0.166 dummy South-Central ethnic groups
-1.496 0.356 -1.243 0.430 dummy Other ethnicity
7. Religion
0.058 1.039 0.176 1.116 dummy Muslim
2.229 2.477 1.093 1.482 dummy Catholic and protestants
1.302 2.555 0.597 1.454 dummy Other religion
730 708 Number of observations
0.2244 0.1409 Pseudo-R square
Note: Harresaw is omitted village; Tigray is omitted ethnicity; Orthodox is omitted religion; no marriag
contract is omitted contract category. Virtually identical results are obtained using conditional logit.
The advantage of the conditional logit estimator is that it avoids avoid estimating a logit regression w
fixed effects.Table 15. Regression Analysis of Ownership of Assets During Marriage
(currently married households only; estimator is two-limit tobit)
Share of livestock owned by: Share of land
husband wife owned' by wife
t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. 1. Assets brought to the marriage
1.237 0.034 -0.470 -0.011 -2.445 -0.087 log(value+1) Pre-marriage land of husband
1.282 0.041 0.049 0.001 -0.011 -0.000 log(value+1) Pre-marriage livestock of husband
1.064 0.040 -0.825 -0.025 -0.186 -0.008 log(value+1) Other assets brought to marriage by husband
2.123 0.065 -3.572 -0.106 -2.144 -0.085 log(value+1) Inherited land of husband
0.355 0.024 1.736 0.076 5.206 0.352 log(value+1) Pre-marriage land of wife
-0.202 -0.010 -0.151 -0.006 -0.002 -0.000 log(value+1) Pre-marriage livestock of wife
-0.623 -0.039 5.269 0.234 5.221 0.452 log(value+1) Other assets brought to marriage by wife
-0.162 -0.008 2.304 0.085 3.307 0.172 log(value+1) Inherited land of wife
2. Gifts at the time of marriage
-0.590 -0.037 -0.363 -0.020 -0.906 -0.078 log(value+1) From groom family to groom
-0.803 -0.034 -0.830 -0.032 -1.910 -0.109 log(value+1) From groom family to bride
1.100 0.053 -1.759 -0.073 -2.760 -0.253 log(value+1) From groom family to bride family
0.782 0.061 -1.516 -0.138 -1.988 -0.533 log(value+1) From groom family to bride and groom
0.610 0.054 -1.302 -0.115 0.406 0.034 log(value+1) From bride family to groom
0.576 0.036 0.791 0.040 0.097 0.007 log(value+1) From bride family to bride
-0.389 -0.025 0.082 0.004 -2.004 -0.227 log(value+1) From bride family to bride and groom
3. Location
0.481 0.445 1.315 0.764 -0.843 -0.495 dummy Geblen village dummy
3.281 3.474 1.639 0.881 -2.126 -2.744 dummy Dinki village dummy
1.502 1.631 -0.394 -0.279 -1.192 -1.313 dummy Yetmen village dummy
0.006 0.006 0.801 0.415 -0.933 -0.939 dummy Shumshaha village dummy
1.999 1.912 0.327 0.181 -1.076 -0.991 dummy Sirbana Godeti village dummy
2.874 2.792 4.000 2.253 1.155 1.108 dummy Adele Keke village dummy
2.143 1.992 3.083 1.610 -1.715 -1.548 dummy Korodega village dummy
1.559 1.409 0.897 0.467 -2.492 -2.142 dummy Trirufe Kechema village dummy
3.808 4.618 0.613 0.390 -2.239 -3.313 dummy Imdibir village dummy
3.556 4.329 0.329 0.241 -1.113 -1.693 dummy Aze Deboa village dummy
4.307 5.326 1.303 0.769 -1.723 -2.242 dummy Adado village dummy
3.484 3.979 2.176 1.188 -1.508 -1.798 dummy Gara Godo village dummy
1.430 1.652 0.096 0.062 -2.889 -4.330 dummy Doma village dummy
0.151 0.161 -0.808 -0.461 -0.303 -0.311 dummy Debre Birhan village dummy
4. Ethnicity
-0.503 -0.369 (*) -0.666 -0.591 dummy Amhara
-0.025 -0.016 (*) -0.508 -0.416 dummy Oromo
0.038 0.032 (*) 0.037 0.039 dummy South-Central ethnic groups
0.363 0.301 (*) -0.401 -0.356 dummy Other ethnicity
5. Religion
0.781 0.375 (*) -0.672 -0.494 dummy Muslim
-0.267 -0.095 (*) 0.964 0.500 dummy Catholic and protestants
-1.752 -1.243 (*) 2.494 2.179 dummy Other religion
-5.178 -4.045 -3.826 -2.000 -0.599 -0.250 Intercept
1.958 1.245 1.671 Selection-term
940 943 988 Number of observations
639 838 874 of which are 0
104 68 54 of which are between 0 and 1
197 37 60 of which are 1
0.255 0.238 0.334 Pseudo-R square
p value F stat. p value F stat. p value F stat. Joint hypothesis tests:
0.0176 3.01 0.0079 3.48 0.0216 2.89 Assets brought to marriage by husband
0.9713 0.13 0.0000 8.76 0.0000 11.19 Assets brought to marriage by wife
0.8568 0.47 0.2596 1.27 0.0036 3.04 Gifts at the time of marriage
Note: Harresaw is omitted village; Tigray is omitted ethnicity; Orthodox is omitted religion; no marriage contract is
omitted contract category. (*) Variable omitted from the regression.Table 16. Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Female Headship
(currently married households only; estimator is logit.)
t stat. Coef. 1. Previous unions and children
0.939 0.208 Number Previous unions of husband
2.285 0.552 Number Previous unions of wife
-2.741 -0.258 Number Husband's children from previous union
1.851 0.313 Number Wife's chidren from previous union
2. Assets brought to the marriage
-1.278 -0.092 log(value Pre-marriage land of husband
-2.003 -0.159 log(value Pre-marriage livestock of husband
-2.127 -0.178 log(value Other assets brought to marriage by husband
-1.088 -0.096 log(value Inherited land of husband
0.594 0.070 log(value Pre-marriage land of wife
-1.223 -0.138 log(value Pre-marriage livestock of wife
7.733 1.038 log(value Other assets brought to marriage by wife
1.118 0.121 log(value Inherited land of wife
3. Location
(*) -16.728 dummy Geblen village dummy
(*) -15.301 dummy Dinki village dummy
0.045 0.092 dummy Yetmen village dummy
0.683 1.230 dummy Shumshaha village dummy
2.232 3.204 dummy Sirbana Godeti village dummy
0.531 0.859 dummy Adele Keke village dummy
0.655 1.060 dummy Korodega village dummy
-1.820 -3.240 dummy Trirufe Kechema village dummy
-0.544 -2.190 dummy Imdibir village dummy
(*) -15.927 dummy Aze Deboa village dummy
-0.520 -2.067 dummy Adado village dummy
-0.576 -2.267 dummy Gara Godo village dummy
-0.264 -1.051 dummy Doma village dummy
1.218 2.109 dummy Debre Birhan village dummy
4. Ethnicity
-1.098 -1.520 dummy Amhara
-1.946 -2.334 dummy Oromo
0.298 1.103 dummy South-Central ethnic groups
-1.041 -2.707 dummy Other ethnicity
5. Religion
0.932 1.178 dummy Muslim
-1.252 -1.462 dummy Catholic and protestants




p value Chi-sq. Joint hypothesis test:
0.001 19.620 Assets brought to marriage by husband
0.000 60.490 Assets brought to marriage by wife
0.002 17.580 Previous unions and children
Note: Harresaw is omitted village; Tigray is omitted ethnicity; Orthodox is omitted
religion; no marriage contract is omitted contract category. (*) Variable predicts no
female head perfectly.